The last explosion of the political crisis in Algeria

The last explosion of the political crisis in Algeria
The announcement of Bouteflika's nomination on Feb. 21, 2019, for a fifth term in April's
presidential election in Algeria, triggered a bomb that sparked unprecedented anger among the
masses. This declaration opened the way for a political crisis amidst the components of the Algerian
authority and its social base, especially between the lower and upper bourgeoisie. The explosion
further exacerbated the claim that citizens were excited about the nomination, and that they
demanded it urgently, knowing that such a claim could not be accepted by the masses or by the various
expressions of the Algerian opposition.
Before February 21, no political or social force was able to threaten power. The latter has never
been the subject of objection except with shaky press statements by "helpless and marginalized
opponents". Even workers' strikes, which tended to grow, did not really scare power. It was preparing
for the re-inauguration of the outgoing president, or, more accurately, his cross-sectional image on all
occasions (formal parties, gatherings ...) by his ardent supporters. The prevailing situation in Algeria
suggests that the dominant power is insurmountable.
However, February 22 has marked a decisive point with this situation, by an unprecedented
mass invasion of the street, following anonymous calls in the social media, to the political arena,
followed by a week of unprecedented popular flow in the country's forty-eight states in increasing
numbers ranging from 15 million and 25 million Algerians. There is a sense of humiliation for the
Algerian people, 50 per cent of whom are younger than 30 years of age. The head of the country is still
completely disabled three years ago and has been unable for seven years to travel except for medical
treatment. Bouteflika's dilapidated image as an incapacitated chief of state was one of the reasons for
the young popular anger in Algeria, which became self-propelled.
This popular mobilization has caused profound transformations in the political distribution.
Breaking the wall of fear and allowing the masses to regain the right to demonstrate in the entire
territory of Algeria, especially in Algiers, which has been blocked since 2001. This has made the
government punish some female party leaders who obstructed the bid of candidates for citizen bail.
Public press, under pressure from its users (journalists and technicians), was forced to analyse the
situation in Algeria in a more clear manner. As well as free speech and initiatives, and paved the way
for protest and demonstration of various social groups: students, lawyers, teachers, doctors and
people with paramedical professions, artists, writers and pupils ... The culmination of all this March
was to demand the departure of the whole system and not Bouteflika alone.
These ongoing demonstrations, which began to take a larger explosive dimension, have
prompted the regime to launch recent manoeuvres in pursuit of further rule, while it has gone beyond
the initiative in a way that cannot yet be said to be temporary or permanent.
- In a letter attributed to Bouteflika read on television, the candidate proposed to organize, in
the event of his re-election, a comprehensive national open-ended seminar in the context of voting to
identify political and economic reforms that were not demanded by citizens during the
demonstrations. The symposium will determine the date of presidential elections prematurely,
Bouteflika is committed not to run for it. But on the eve of the same declaration, spontaneous youth
demonstrations broke out in several cities, followed by new student demonstrations throughout the
country the following day, and an anonymous announcement of a general strike in a week from 10 to
15 March. The SPLM is now united in an unprecedented manner around the slogan "no to the fifth
promise" and the departure of the entire regime.
"There is no place for a fifth term and there will be no presidential election on April 18," Algerian
President Abdelaziz Bouteflika announced on Monday (March 11th), one day after returning from the
Geneva University Hospital where he underwent treatment. President Abdelaziz Bouteflika announced
his candidacy for a fifth term, the Algerians expressed joy at "winning the popular will." But a few hours
later, angry leaflets returned to Facebook, where many activists expressed their rejection of the
measures taken. Friday 15 March, against what was called "an attempt to circumvent the Peaceful
movement. "Although the first demonstrations began to drop the candidacy to the fifth term, the
ceiling has risen and many activists and opponents are calling for a radical change of the regime," a
change based on a constitutional council and a national unity government that does not share the
faces that worked at length with Bouteflika, The political Karim Tabou.
- Army Chief of Staff Ahmed Kayed Saleh called on Tuesday morning, March 26, 2019, to apply
a constitutional provision that provides for the vacancy of the post of president of the country or his
resignation to resolve the current crisis. "A solution must be adopted to ensure that the crisis is
resolved and that it responds to the legitimate demands of the Algerian people, which is the solution
that guarantees respect for the provisions of the constitution and the continuity of state sovereignty,"
Saleh said. He went on «a solution that would achieve the consensus of the views of all and acceptable
to all parties, the solution provided for in the Constitution in Article 102». Article 102 of the Algerian
Constitution stipulates that in case of resignation, death or incapacity of the President, the President
of the National Assembly (Parliament) will be appointed for 90 days during which new elections will be
held. However, on the eve of the same day, reactions to the decision of the military staff Ahmed Kayed
Saleh began by many of the Algerian political figures and forces, based on the fact that Kayed Saleh is
illegitimate in announcing the decision, knowing that the end of the president's entitlement is April 28,
2019, 102 should be automatically activated by the Constitutional Council. Qaid Saleh's decision was
considered too late and insufficient. In addition, that the process is a new coup d’état against the will
of the Algerian people, in order to maintain its hegemony over the continuation of the regime.
Many military circles are hoping that the army will bring former Algerian President General
Yamin Zeroual as a respected figure to hold power during a transitional period of "fair" presidential
elections and to ensure the continuity of the existing regime.
Structure of the Algerian regime and power
History of military and civil political competition in Algeria:
The Algerian army today derives its historical legitimacy from the military resistance to the
French colonialism that began since the occupation of the region in 1830 and ousted it from the
Ottoman hegemony. Note that the Algerian state with its borders today was formed only under French
colonialism.
Immediately after the occupation in 1830, Algeria had known military resistance against the
French, including the resistance of Prince Abdelkader in the west of Algeria and the resistance of Lalla
Fatima Nsumer, Haj El Moukrani and Sheikh Haddad in the Kabylie region, Ahmed Bay in the east of
Algeria, Sheikh Bouamama in the southwest and Sheikh Amoud at Tuareg and other resistances , All
these military resistances failed to liberate the country from the occupier, which led to the conviction
of many Algerians at the end of the nineteenth century that it is very difficult to liberate the country
by military means, they began to think about cultural resistance and political methods for the judiciary
In the beginning of the 20th century, the failure of military methods to liberate the country became
apparent. The decision was reintroduced to the political methods led by the politicians who began to
establish political organizations. .
We must record this very important observation, because it will explain to us many things about
the relationship between military and political in Algeria during the armed revolution. This observation
is that the military resistance in the nineteenth century was so rural that some called it peasant
revolutions, The political resistance, however, emerged in the cities by the urban bourgeoisie and was
not radical in its demands. It was based on progressive and progressive work. The rural population
closed themselves down, rejecting all that came from Europe or even politicians. In the cities where
he was raised They are influenced by European culture and its way of life, in other words the
countryside has entered a negative cultural resistance against the colonizer.
But in the same period, due to several crises, Algeria knew rural migrations to the cities, the
most important being the migration to France, especially the inhabitants of the tribal region, they
discovered the political work in France, they formed a political organization named the star of North
Africa in 1926, , Which was radical and revolutionary in its proposals, and once again revived the idea
of armed resistance as a method of liberating the country, which was prevalent in the nineteenth
century, or what was called revolutionary violence, the French authorities resolved the organization of
North Africa star several times, before moving to Algeria, The designation of the Algerian People's
Party in 1937, then the Hip for the victory of democratic freedoms in 1946, this organization has spread
strongly in rural areas and among the urban population with rural assets.
This period was a struggle between this radical rural organization and other urban political
organizations. The first called for revolutionary violence as a solution to the liberation of the country.
This put it in a position of confrontation not only with the colonial system but also with the urban
political organizations that called for a political solution These groups were called the Political
Reformists, represented by Farhat Abbas, who founded the Democratic Union of the Algerian
Declaration in 1947, the Algerian Communist Party, and the Association of Muslim Scholars To the
Algerians led by Sheikh Abdel Hamid bin Badis and then Sheikh Mohammed al-Bashir al-Ibrahimi, which
was an ally of Farhat Abbas on the political level and hostile to the radical rural organization headed
by Masali al-Hajj.
We can say that this conflict is a conflict between rural people who believe in a military solution
and urban politicians who believe in a political solution to get rid of colonialism, but this conflict
between the two sides extended even into this radical revolutionary organization which became the
name of the movement for the victory of democratic freedoms after the Second World War , After the
war joined some of the urban or rural people who graduated from and influenced the French schools,
and they controlled the Central Committee of the party, they entered into a conflict with Masali Haj,
the party leader, which was supported by the base of the rural party, and almost broke up this
organization Without the intervention of the organization's special elements, which is a paramilitary
organization of the Movement for the Victory of Democratic Freedom, whose task is to prepare for the
armed action for the liberation of Algeria. The elements of this organization took the initiative to
initiate armed action and to force the two conflicting parties , To join the armed action, and thus broke
the armed revolution on the night of November 1, 1954.
The paramilitaries of the paramilitary organization dominated the armed revolution. From this
organization emerged the first pioneers of the National Liberation Army as the armed wing of the
National Liberation Front, which led the liberation revolution. The members of the paramilitary
organization had the courage to save the movement from the impasse Politicians within the
movement, without forgetting to mention, that most members of the paramilitary paramilitary
organization viewed with suspicion and doubt, if not contempt for those politicians who saw them as
struggling for the gains they would gain from the G in the elections that were organized by the colonial
administration, did not forget those members with rural roots, how abandoned these politicians when
the discovery of the colonial organization for the authorities in 1950, and all of this leads us to address
the relationship between the two parties during the editorial revolution.
The failure of the political resistance in the first half of the 20th century led to the emergence
of a special paramilitary organization hostile to the politicians, who considered them merely
opportunists. This particular organization was behind the ignition of the liberation revolution in 1954,
but we should point out that despite this view it was not at the beginning The armed revolution, ie,
the distinction between the military and the political, was military and political leaders at the same
time. The issue began after the 1956 Siyam Conference, when the principle of political priority was
placed on the military, It was not intended to remove the military The decision, but the goal is to give
a political nature of the revolution based on the idea that the war Clausewitz political objective,
which is why military leaders who attended the conference did not oppose this principle, and even
Abane Ramadan itself is a military and political at the same time.
The speech that was presented in the document was directed to the world public opinion,
especially French public opinion. The criticisms and false accusations of Ramadan, especially by Ben
Bella, are more about a power struggle between the two men, Ben Bella.
But what the military later took on Aban Ramadan was the inclusion of elements of the
politicians who belonged to the urban bourgeoisie who were in conflict with the independent
movement of rural and revolutionary character, especially the members of the special organization.
This conflict was restored before the outbreak of the revolution This was all mixed up in a struggle
over power and leadership among the powerful elements within the National Liberation Front and
Army, which belonged to the rural and revolutionary independence movement. Among these are
Aban Ramadan and Ahmad Bin Bella, who entered In grate Ended with the hijacking of the plane of
the four leaders in October 1956, namely Ahmed bin Bella, Mohammed Boudiaf, Hussein Ait Ahmed
and Mohammed Khidr, and later broke out another conflict between Aban Ramadan and Karim
Belkacem, both of whom are from the tribal region. The first was supported by a group of urban
politicians, To the ranks of the revolution, after what was seen to be against the revolutionary armed
action before 1954, and that they joined the revolution only to gain and erase their previous political
positions, without forgetting the reference to the suspicion and suspicion that surrounded them a
long time ago, Karim Belkacem was behind him Ben Tobal and Abdel Haf Who later formed what was
known in the history of the Algerian revolution as "the three innocents", as well as other military
leaders such as Omar O'mran and Mahmoud al-Sharif, who were taken aback to give great influence
to these urban politicians who did not even believe in the independence of Algeria - The five colonels
were behind the decision to get rid of Abadan Ramadan and then to filter it treacherously in the Far
Maghreb. Then another conflict emerged between the three Ba'athists, namely Karim Belkacem,
commander of the National Liberation Army, and Abdelhafiz Boussouf, who is in charge of public
communications. Whose role was similar to that of the interior minister, but the irony is that the
relationship between these three is a power struggle, while at the same time forming a holy alliance
against the politicians who later joined the revolution.
The speech that was presented in the document was addressed to the world public opinion,
especially the French public opinion. The criticisms and false accusations of Ramadan, especially from
Ben Bella, are more about a power struggle between the two men, not about the principles, The
problem.
But what the military later took on Aban Ramadan was the inclusion of elements of the
politicians who belonged to the urban bourgeoisie who were in conflict with the independent
movement of rural and revolutionary character, especially the members of the special organization.
This conflict was restored before the outbreak of the revolution This was all mixed up in a struggle over
power and leadership among the powerful elements within the National Liberation Front and Army,
which belonged to the rural and revolutionary independence movement. Among these are Aban
Ramadan and Ahmad Bin Bella, who entered In grate Ended with the hijacking of the plane of the four
leaders in October 1956, namely Ahmed bin Bella, Mohammed Boudiaf, Hussein Ait Ahmed and
Mohammed Khidr, and later broke out another conflict between Aban Ramadan and Karim Belkacem,
both of whom are from the tribal region. The first was supported by a group of urban politicians, To
the ranks of the revolution, after what was seen to be against the revolutionary armed action before
1954, and that they joined the revolution only to gain and erase their previous political positions,
without forgetting the reference to the suspicion and suspicion that surrounded them a long time ago,
Karim Belkacem was behind him Ben Tobal and Abdel Haf Who later formed what was known in the
history of the Algerian revolution as "the three innocents", as well as other military leaders such as
Omar O'mran and Mahmoud al-Sharif, who were taken aback to give great influence to these urban
politicians who did not even believe in the independence of Algeria - The five colonels were behind the
decision to get rid of Abadan Ramadan and then to filter it treacherously in the Far Maghreb. Then
another conflict emerged between the three Ba'athists, namely Karim Belkacem, commander of the
National Liberation Army, and Abdelhafiz Boussouf, who is in charge of public communications. Whose
role was similar to that of the interior minister, but the irony is that the relationship between these
three is a power struggle, while at the same time forming a holy alliance against the politicians who
later joined the revolution.
This intertwined conflict between the three Baha'is on the one hand, and between them and a
group of politicians on the other, introduced the revolution into acute crises culminating in the
summer of 1959, and they were only able to return to the military for judging them in these sharp
conflicts. The representatives of the 10 Decades who have been appointed by the National Council of
the Algerian Revolution, which will give legitimacy only to the new government to be appointed, so
that the military are in a stronger position, where they are in control of all things, and did not stop at
this limit, The decade of the decade More than a hundred days ago, the strength of the three Baha'is
and the emergence of a new force, led by Hawari Boumediene, the General Staff of the National
Liberation Army (ULIMO), entered into a struggle against the provisional government of the Algerian
Republic, composed of politicians and the three Ba'athists. The pillars are the weakening of the three
Ba'athists, who controlled the politicians, leading to a greater weakening of the group of politicians.
When the liberation war was over, the Army Command was in a position of strength by virtue
of its control of the border army estimated at more than 23,000 soldiers who were far from the
battlefield and had stronger equipment than the war-weary army of the French army. All the
conditions were ripe for the capture of Boumediene and his group In the leadership of the General
Staff of the Palestinian Authority, first hiding behind one of the historical leaders of the revolution,
Ahmed Ben Bella.
Thus, the influence of the army is determined by the restoration of Algeria's independence,
and as long as the group that seized power was not popularly popular, historical or even
revolutionary, because we can say that it did not launch a single shot at the French army, It is natural
to rely on force for the survival of the state under its control, which inevitably leads to increased
influence of the army, especially the security and intelligence services.
The new regime did not only do this, but distorted the history by obliterating the history of the
real heroes of the revolution. At the same time, it focused on the idea that the army liberated the
country, without any distinction between the army of the interior, which was devoured by the fire of
war and the heavy price. Maneuvering to take advantage of the sacrifice of the army of the interior.
In order to give the leadership of this army the legitimacy of power, the system established in the
minds of Algerians in general, that this army is the descendant of the National Liberation Army, and
that the country freed the armed action, without distinguishing between the great role and the
sacrifices of the Mujahideen inside to liberate the country - After the restoration of independence -
and the border army, whose members did not know much of the war of liberation in the interior and
suffering, and became a very large proportion of the Algerian army led by Boumediene in the early
years of independence, and focused the media and the educational system in teaching the history of
the revolution on armed action, Du To political, diplomatic and other work. This led to the degree
that any simple Algerian asked him about the concept or meaning of the revolution, but he replied
that the armed action, and even the history of the country starts from the date of the beginning of
the armed revolution. The aim of all this is to give the military legitimacy the historical and
revolutionary, if not The transfer of holiness, which will eventually lead to the feeling of the people
that he owes in his presence to this army, which was behind the liberation of the country without
distinction between the border army abroad and the mujahedeen inside, the people have no right to
hold him accountable as long as he owes him his existence, independence and welfare.
It is also natural that the decision is in the hands of the army as long as it was behind the new
regime, which is the day after the restoration of Algeria's independence. This happens in all
revolutions. The forces that are behind the revolution are the ones who monopolize power. They do
not trust any other power. These forces are often the will of the country, for if the religious scholars
were behind the revolution to monopolize power, as did the ayatollahs in Iran to name a few.
Nevertheless, this monopoly of power and intervention in the political field was all in the first
decades of independence. However, as the officers of the revolution retired, and the generation of
independence rose to the helm of the military establishment, the role of the army in intervening in
political affairs declined as we have already indicated.
It is clear to us from the above that the circumstantial circumstances in which the Algerian
national state was established in 1962 gave the military establishment a major role in the Algerian
political decision-making. This is due to the fundamental role played by the army in the process of
liberating Algeria from the French occupation; we also realized that this great role of the army was not
inevitable for the country. This influence appeared in the first decades of the national state only and
began to decline over time, especially after the retirement of the army commanders who participated
in the armed liberation revolution both abroad and at home. , And the rise of a new generation of
military commanders Moon to the generation of independence to the helm of the Algerian military
leadership.
The composition of the ruling power in Algeria
The ruling power in Algeria is composed today of a heart composed of the leadership of the
army, the parties of the presidency, the national gendarmerie, security interests, the general
administration of national security, the government and other institutions (the Supreme Court, the
Constitutional Council, the National People's Assembly and the National Assembly) And the leaders of
the Salafi organizations of the Authority: the General Union of Algerian Workers, the Forum of Heads
of Establishments, the National Federation of Algerian Women and some ten organizations of religious
influence: Zawaya Sufi and the Association of Algerian Muslim Scholars.
The ruling authority of Algeria organizes an arbitrator and a disciplined officer who holds public
power and administration and supervises a large media apparatus and the state's financial and
material means.
The establishment of the army is the driving heart of the ruling power in Algeria and the
commandment of the Algerian people to make major decisions since 1962, this year who decided to
change the face of the system of government in Algeria is the army, because the SOMAM was the
priority of the home abroad and the priority of policy on But in 1962 the army decided otherwise to
establish a police military state. In 1965, a coup d'état in Algeria by Bouteflika and Boumedienne was
carried out in the history books of revolutionary reform, as if the revolution were wrong and they were
working to correct it. The coup was carried out by the army. In 1979, following the death of former
Algerian President Houari Boumedienne, the army came to the head of a new state, Col. Chadly. In
1992, the army again stopped the electoral process. This year, the army decided that the political scene
was rotten and that it was necessary to install the Higher State Committee for the conduct of state
affairs. In 1996, the army again decided to bring General Yamin Zeroual to head it. In 1999, the army
decided to bring Abdelaziz Bouteflika to the post of head of state. In this context, General Khaled Nizar
acknowledges in his memoirs that he and General Tawfiq brought Bouteflika to the presidency. Finally,
on March 26, 2019, the decision to go to President Bouteflika in accordance with Chapter 102 of the
constitution is the army.
The exit of the Algerian people into the street as a whole has confused the army accounts and
the accounts of the Authority and has become the subject of a strong and decisive objection.
Therefore, the confrontation is open between the army, which holds power with an iron fist and the
movement of the popular masses of self-propulsion, which began to express a deep desire to get rid
of the existing dictatorial regime and restore full power to improve its future. In the coming days,
especially on Fridays, we will see the extent to which the popular masses insist on rejecting the army's
domination over its fate.
There is no objective reason to justify a possible resort to force today. On the other hand, this
solution would be one of the weakest in terms of chances of success. It will undoubtedly lead to a
general strike and civil disobedience, and may generate chaos and foreign interference often
condemned by the Deputy Minister of Defense and the Chief of the Supreme Command of the National
People's Army.
Monopolistic state capitalism in Algeria
The dominant authority in Algeria, apart from ideological propaganda and domination, is based
on its historical, religious and authoritarian components, on a social basis of the two bourgeoisie,
consisting of a capitalist class formed from various social strata of administrative and technocratic
bureaucracy emanating from their positions within the Algerian public companies and institutions.
Capital production methods. In addition, a high bourgeoisie that overlaps with world capital and
monopolizes foreign trade in particular, a bourgeoisie that can be called the Comprador bourgeoisie.
The Algerians talk about the strong dependency relations between the army establishment and the
components of the smaller bourgeois comprador. Alternatively, between the military establishment
and the world of finance and business with all its deals, production, export and corruption as well.
This organic relationship, between the institutions of the Authority and the bourgeoisie
supervising the Algerian capitalist economy. both within the framework of state capitalism intervening
before the adoption of structural adjustment policy, or began to implement the programs of economic
adjustment and inhibition of the years 1994 and 1995 due to the aggravation of Algerian debt from
the decline in oil revenues in 1986. The accumulation Capitalism and the actual economic dominance
of the bourgeoisie from the application of structural adjustment programs because of the
opportunities that these programs offered for rapid capital accumulation.
The integration of the capitalist monopolies with the state apparatus in Algeria became
apparent, especially through the domination of the interests of the state over the public sector. A
capitalist class of high-ranking officials and technocrats formed the decisive economic decision makers
in the process of the Algerian capitalist monopolies. Monopoly is similar to the Indian model:
The trend toward economic liberalism began in 1980, but the state was still the mastermind of
economic management. Energy and energy resources remain within the public domain at the expense
of the advocates of super-liberalism in power, opposition and the dictates of the imperialist powers
(the G-7) and their financial institutions (IMF and World Bank ...).
In spite of liberalism and privatization, in line with the corrective programs, large public
contracts were privatized, such as the National Ironstone Company, for ArcelorMittal, and Asmadel,
which became a fraud after the Spanish group Grupo Villar Mir became the majority shareholder. Abi
Haddad, president of the employers' union (the forum of heads of institutions), was thwarted to buy
the shares of the Spanish group, with the complicity of the prime minister. Bouteflika forced the
government to exercise the right of pre-emption in favour of the state, which is once again holding the
majority of the shares of this enterprise. The President did not issue the Law on the cheap sale of
hydrocarbons, which was ratified in 2005 and was finally amended a year later.
The continuity of the investment law has been maintained for ten years. It is the judge of the
Algerian companies holding the majority of shares (51/49). The government has been able to achieve
a decline in imports strongly, through government measures through the system of allocation, and
prevention, applying very high fees ...
The Authority has endeavoured to maintain balance in the context of the contradiction between
the clear trend toward economic liberalism on the one hand and the stalemate and the permanent
retreats of the dominance of the public sector, which has contributed to the continuity of integration
between state organs and monopolies.
Multinational companies boasting exports of fertilizers and cement (Frital, Lafarge, etc.) are
doing so thanks to state gas subsidies. Where the cement is issued half the price and the Sonelgaz
contract is a deficit of 23 billion dollars!
Crisis of political hegemony of the Algerian bourgeoisie:
Contradictions between the ruling bourgeoisie factions in Algeria under the control of power are
a major obstacle to the actual hegemony of capital, especially in the context of the adoption of ultra-
liberalism. This bourgeois domination is deficient due to class contradictions in Algerian society.
The internal petty bourgeoisie tries to triumph over the policies of liberalism, but this ambition
clashes with its lack of a sovereign project and its refusal to confront the world imperialist system
economically, politically and diplomatically, in order to gain credibility in the popular circles. This petty
bourgeoisie remains subject to public demand and needs to protect the State in order to achieve its
accumulation in the face of the global market.
The petty bourgeoisie collides with two obstacles: the first concerns active and passive
resistance by the masses and a part of the state apparatus.
This bourgeois wing, which is constantly led by the authorities to pass its reforms, is forced to
evade, progress and retreat. To date, it has not succeeded in completing its structural economic
reforms, nor has it fully integrated into the imperialist system.
However, this bourgeoisie refuses to return to the national development policy, which is being
robbed by part of the surplus value it takes from the hard workers and to resist the policies of the
imperialist regime imposed on Algeria by the international financial institutions, as Algeria did
relatively under the government of Houari Boumediene.
The petty bourgeoisie is forced to apply its liberal economic and social policies such as freezing
wages and pensions, depriving the gains of the labour law, unemployment ... of prevarication, but
reluctant to demand the use of force against the labour masses and popular classes that refuse to
destroy their gains. Thus, it is clear that this bourgeoisie is unable to accept acceptance by the victims
of exploitation and domination.
The second obstacle to the small bourgeoisie of the interior is its inability to obtain the approval
of the Comprador bourgeoisie, defending a liberal ideal of integration and submission to the world
market and the imperialist system.
It is noteworthy that the Comprador bourgeoisie has been greatly strengthened over the past
three decades, benefiting from the civil war, that facilitated the sabotage and looting of public
enterprises by the International Monetary Fund (the Structural Stabilization Program signed in 1994)
and the transformation of Algeria's economy from production and industry to parasitic economy Of
imperialism based on export and import.
This comprador bourgeoisie is growing, and continues to underscore the lack of will of the
Authority in the field of structural reforms and integration into the world market.
The inner petty bourgeoisie finds itself between the teeth of pliers of the popular masses on the
one hand and the comprador wing supported by imperialism on the other
The Comprador bourgeoisie has worked for many years to gain power through traditional
formative parties, the most important of which are the Society for Peace Movement - the Muslim
Brotherhood Movement, the Rally for Culture and Democracy with the Secularist Direction, the First
Liberties Party of former Prime Minister Ali Benfis, ...
The Comprador bourgeoisie is supported by the Western imperialist centres, the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank ... that are exerting constant pressure on the Algerian authority.
The Comprador bourgeoisie affects an important part of the people and groups within the petty
bourgeoisie who share the view that structural and economic reforms must be adopted, but they have
not yet dared to take a position in their favour, fearing the reaction of the Authority.
Broadly, the integration of new rich people in the system through the elected parties and
institutions (the National People's Congress, the National Assembly, the People's Councils and the
Municipal People's Councils), as well as the direct or indirect presence of the military or their relatives
in business, Forces in favor of the comprador bourgeoisie.
Its small internal bourgeois rival, which now leads the country to its advantage by its harmony,
is unable to gain wide public support to block the possibility of returning to national and social
development policies, which it refuses to adopt.
There is a rising dynamism of the bourgeoisie of the Cambrian. Moreover, works to gain
dominance within the ruling classes. But its relations with the world capitalist powers and imperialist
countries away from them a wide impression of the deep Algerian state descended from the war of
national liberation and the national development policies of the first two decades of independence.
These sectors are essential for national independence and security.
On the other hand, the Comprador bourgeoisie has great difficulties in gaining acceptance of
the victims of exploitation and oppression, because its ultra-liberal economic and social project is more
severe and cruel to the masses. Can they, under these conditions, reach power through the ballot
boxes?
If the Comprador bourgeoisie reaches power, by taking advantage of the crisis, or because it is
currently the only political alternative to the existing authority, what will be the response of the
popular masses? As workers, unemployed and young people are in no way willing to accept that policy,
it is highly likely that this bourgeoisie, which claims democracy, will rule in an anti-democratic way to
pass a dose described by super-liberalism.
This failure to achieve the actual hegemony of capital on the work of the two branches of the
Algerian bourgeoisie is the root of the regime and power crisis in Algeria. The inability to govern in a
uniform manner and the acceptance of victims of exploitation and persecution.
So the regime and power cannot be democratized. This is a decades-long crisis that is deepening.
And accelerated during 2018.
The consequences of the domestic policy crisis
The contradictions of Algeria's economic situation under the monopolization of monopolistic
state capitalism in Algeria fuel many tensions within the regime, prompting the government to take
super-authoritarian measures to subjugate the social classes to its will. Which fuels political opposition
and growing popular resentment.
Unemployment reaches 11.7% of the active population, reaching a peak of 28.3% among young
people (16-24), with young people accounting for more than 50% of the Algerian population.
Moreover, where young graduates do not have jobs. 43 % of the wage earners are not enrolled in
social security. The purchasing power of workers, unemployed, landless peasants, poor peasants, small
artisans and traders is deteriorating ... due to rising prices, falling dinar values and stagnation of wages
and pensions. The severely disadvantaged classes are also affected by the decline in the State's
commitment to education and health services.
While the Authority rethinks the rest of the welfare of the state by cutting budget expenditures,
its policies favor the dominant bourgeois classes (Algerian and foreign capitalists, landowners,
importers, senior merchants, sublime liberties ...) benefiting from the expropriation of the Algerian
people through Privatization, public-private partnership ...) and generous assistance from the
Authority.
The increasing tease of imperialism
The external policies of the Authority support the cause of the Palestinian and Saharawi peoples,
while adopting negative neutrality towards imperialist interventions in Libya, Syria and Yemen, and
rejecting any involvement of the National People's Army in operations outside borders. The Authority
continues to ostensibly exercise a policy of opposition to the establishment of foreign military bases in
Algeria and openly rejects the establishment of transit centres for migrants, while practically
permitting.
The Algerian authorities continue to support and defend the Saudi regime, while committing
itself to the covert silence of destabilizing Venezuela. It remains silent on the "return of Israel" to the
Sahel and the silence about the proliferation of military bases and American or French interventions
in the region.